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The British in 1940 ‘agreed on the necessity of preventing the territories’ [Congo’s] raw
materials from falling into the hands of the Germans (Fetter 1988: 382).
It was said [during the Cold War] that the West would go to war to keep Zaire within the
western orbit (Mazrui and Ajayi 1993: 651).
We must also find effective ways to secure Africa’s vast natural resources – its diamonds,
cobalt, uranium, oil, timber, coltan, its gold – so they do not provide currency for the
world's terrorists (Rice 2001: 12).
We think the West has used Uganda and Rwanda to invade our country so they can mine
our riches without paying (Pole Institute 2001).
The number of excess deaths directly attributable to Rwandan and Ugandan occupation
can be estimated at between 3 million and 3.5 million (UN 2002).
 
 A great deal of transnational policy and associated research concerning African
natural resource use has explored opportunities for reshaping patterns of govern-
ance to influence and improve the management of environmental resources.
However, such aspirations must contend with an inverse process: how transna-
tional engagement with environmental resources is influencing patterns of gov-
ernance and local resource management.
Nowhere has this been clearer than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
whose rubber supported the car revolution, whose uranium supported the nucle-
ar revolution, and whose cobalt and tantalum now support the technological rev-
olution. Alongside these strategic minerals, it has massive reserves of diamonds,
gold and now oil. These resources have been financing conflicts since 1996,
which best estimates suggest have cost three million Congolese lives. This chapter
will state what has become so obvious during the recent civil wars: that it is im-
possible to consider politics and governance anywhere in the DRC without con-
sidering the country’s wider engagement with the industrialised world. Yet how
does this influence local resource use? In beginning to address this question, I
shall consider how the modes of resource governance associated with these cur-
rent conflicts long precede them, and thus why, as Keen puts it (1998), ‘war can
usefully be seen as a deepening of exploitative processes already existing in “nor-
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mal” times’. The present chapter shows how current modes of resource extraction
that we can associate with the conflict have been shaped in a similar fashion for a
century. 
A linked statement of the obvious is that international interest in some of the
DRC’s resources will shape modes of governance and thus the management of
others. Viewed in this way, it becomes inappropriate to differentiate environmen-
tal resources in the conventional way between ‘renewable’ and ‘non-renewable’,
or between agro-ecological/living resources (such as forest, cocaine, coffee, con-
servation and rubber), and minerals (such as oil, cobalt, coltan
 
1
 
, uranium, dia-
monds and gold). Arguably, making a strong distinction between these and
treating them as if they were radically separate has long enabled the transnational
configuration of resource governance, use and sustainability to be downplayed.
The focus on renewables and land, as well as on their scarcity, always seems to
lead analysts to explore the causes of resource conflicts in a localised way. For ex-
ample, ‘population increase’ on location has been considered to increase demand
for renewable resources and their value, or poverty or social transformation on lo-
cation to undermine long-term sustainable management. The way that 
 
interna-
tional and global political and economic forces affect wider governance and thus local
environmental practices is eclipsed. 
 
We lose sight of how mining, timber, agri-busi-
ness and conservation business affect governance (and conflicts) and through this,
affect located social, political and economic orders, environmental practices and
their sustainability. The wider links are often marginal in works relating territory,
demography and scarcity together as the main explanation for conflicts over nat-
ural resource management. My intention here is to demonstrate that they need
to be analytically centred by tracing how profoundly they shape the social rela-
tions of everyday resource management. 
I shall consider these links in the Kivu region of the DRC, and more particu-
larly through the lens of the province of Bwisha, and of a small village there where
I conducted fieldwork some time ago, for two years between 1986 and 1989. The
province has since attracted considerable attention, if not detailed fieldwork, that
enables me to contextualise the current war economy within a deeper economic
history. Bwisha is a Rwandan (Kinyarwanda)-speaking province extending north
of the town of Goma, and filling out a triangle where the DRC borders on both
Uganda and Rwanda. Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, it hosted hun-
dreds of thousands of Hutu refugees fleeing the post-genocide regime in Rwanda.
Then in 1996, Rwandan and Ugandan troops occupied the province and forcibly
emptied these camps. These troops then supported the major rebellion that went
on to topple the DRC’s notorious kleptocratic president, Mobutu Sese Seko – a
 
1. Coltan is the ore from which tantalum is derived. The tensile, heat and electrical properties of
tantalum make it a crucial ingredient in armour penetration and missile technology, housing
radioactive elements, including in nuclear reactors, manufacturing capacitors for third-genera-
tion computer technology (e.g. in mobile phones), rocket motors and radiation shielding
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rebellion of allied oppositions led by Laurent Kabila. After two years, however,
Laurent Kabila fell out with his Ugandan and Rwandan backers, and the latter
gave their support to a second rebellion, this time against Kabila that continued
until 2003. At the time of writing, Bwisha is currently under the control of Rwan-
da and Rwandan-backed rebels. To its north, the Nande-speaking region of the
DRC is controlled by Uganda and Ugandan-backed rebels. There have also been
clashes between these rebel groupings, and indeed, between different factions
within each of them, linked to competition over mining areas. Whilst the occu-
pation by Rwanda and Uganda had its origins in their need to protect their bor-
ders from hostile forces based in the DRC, a sequence of UN reports documents
how this logic has mutated into, or been a cover for, ‘the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo’ (e.g. UN 2001
2002). 
 
Looting Kivu: A History of Practice
 
Kivu was looted before by Rwanda, during in the nineteenth century. While this
Rwandan presence protected the province from being looted by Tippu Tip’s inte-
rior slave- and ivory-trading empire, which was based near modern Kisangani, its
own occupation was not itself benign. Kivu was then looted by the Belgian colo-
nial administration, which established a mode of land, labour and resource expro-
priation that has lasted up until the present day. Understanding this mode is
important in order to consider its local manifestations in lived experience – how
it plays out in one village and its resource management. 
Bwisha was relatively independent of Rwandan rule until the mid-nineteenth
century. Until then there had been a gradual influx of pastoralists (Batutsi), but
they recognised the authority of the more or less confederated principalities that
they encountered (Vunabandi 1979: 11). How and when the Rwandan state first
came to rule over Bwisha is not certain, but three phases in the development of
Rwandan rule can be distinguished: the conquering of Bwisha (on and off from
the fifteenth century): the imposition of Rwandan delegate rulers (late eighteenth
century), and the systematic taxation of the province from the late nineteenth
century. 
During the eighteenth century, the Rwandan monarchy acquired sufficient
power to appoint chiefs to rule over Bwisha’s principalities. In some of them the
existing lineage rulers were chosen as the vehicle for indirect rule, but in others
direct rule was imposed. In all, a hierarchical administrative structure was created
in which the province 
 
(ikihugu
 
) was ruled by a provincial delegate. The province
was subdivided into districts ruled by local district chiefs, and this was itself di-
vided into administrative hills, each with their own chief (Kashori 1983). 
Bwisha was first taxed systematically during the rule of the expansionist
Rwandan monarch, Rwabugiri in the late 19th century. He extended Rwanda’s
borders far into what is now the Kivu region of the DRC. By the time of his
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death, the independent authority of Bwisha’s princes had been eradicated. Those
chiefs who had not been replaced by outsiders only retained their position by vir-
tue of their loyalty to the Rwandan monarchy. Rwanda levied heavy taxes on pro-
duce and labour. When documented early in the Belgian era, each ‘lineage’ was
said to provide 110 baskets of sorghum, 15 baskets of beans, 2000 leaves of to-
bacco, perfumes, salt, calabashes, lance shafts, an ivory tusk, animal skins, brace-
lets, beer, butter and other commodities, as well as 10% of the cattle (Dubuisson
1935). The tax was collected by a ‘hill chief’, who took a 10% cut, passing the
rest on to the ‘district chief’, who took a 10% cut before passing it to the ‘provin-
cial’ chief, who took his cut, before dispatching the produce to the centre. The
products were carried to the royal court by conscripted porters. These taxes fell
most heavily on those subordinate to the ruling lineage. Each lineage also had to
supply two man-days of labour in every five to work for the chiefs at various levels
of the hierarchy. The threat of Rwanda’s elite soldiers (
 
inkemba
 
) enforced tax pay-
ment (Kashori 1983: 15–23).
Rwandan control was imposed on a political set-up conventionally described
as ‘nested lineages’: the founding lineage that first cleared the land would make
land available to other newcomers, who became its political subordinates and
who had to pay ‘tribute’ to their overlords. They in turn could make land that
they received available to others, and so on. While this may not capture the spe-
cific history in each district, it does represent well the nested sets of dyadic rela-
tions that structured access to land, political status and taxation. The heavy
taxation by Rwanda accentuated the expropriative nature of these relations.
Nominal tribute became a heavy tax, falling disproportionately on those in struc-
turally inferior positions. 
The first colonial military post was installed in 1902, when the Congo was the
Belgian kings’ fiefdom. As the Belgian colonial administration strengthened (af-
ter the outrageous exactions of the King’s administration were exposed, and pow-
er transferred to Belgium), and especially after 1910, when the borders with
Rwanda and Uganda were fixed, the Belgians attempted to force Bwisha chiefs to
pay taxes to them, not the Rwandan court. Nevertheless, Bwisha princes contin-
ued to pay taxes to the Rwandan monarchy until 1914, as to begin with they were
not convinced that the Belgians would stay (Matagne 1964; Kashori 1983: 72–
7). The Belgian administration soon sought to identify pliable intermediary
chiefs of their own through whom they could rule. The Belgians focused their at-
tention on an interpreter, Ndeze, who had worked with them to assist military
requisitioning during the First World War (when Belgian- and German-backed
forces fought an entrenched battle in the area between 1915 and 1917). Although
his claim to rule was tenuous, Belgian support enabled him to be elected as su-
preme leader over the many principalities. He then consolidated his authority by
deposing all Rwandan-backed leaders and replacing them with his own appoint-
ees (Misabiro 1980: 19; Bwana Kweli 1985; Munyaruenzi 1980; Bangamwabo
1982). He also gained authority in a similar way over a neighbouring province,
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Bwito. For chiefs at every level of the hierarchy, disobedience was sanctioned by
suspension of power, either for short periods or for good. 
From the 1920s, a powerful coercive combination of this chief, the colonial
administration, European entrepreneurs, the army and the police was able to ex-
propriate huge areas of land from cultivators, either for coffee plantations or for
a national park. They imposed heavy taxes, and forcibly recruited labour for plan-
tations, road building and infrastructure. Once again, as will become clear, these
exactions fell most heavily on political subordinates. 
To attract colonial investment and promote the region’s economic develop-
ment, Kivu was privatised. A company called the Comité National de Kivu (CN-
Ki) was formed and empowered with the right to collect taxes. It had exclusive
rights over forests, mining and all ‘vacant ground’, which it could sell as it wished,
but it was duty bound to re-invest the proceeds in Kivu’s infractructure (Mendi-
aux 1956, Drevet 1977). Legally the rights of local populations to their lands
were upheld. However, CNKi was frustrated because first, all the best coffee-
growing areas were occupied, secondly, there was no unclaimed land, and thirdly,
it was difficult to recruit labour to work the lands that were less populated. With
the connivance of pliable chiefs such as Ndeze, and to their huge personal profit,
CNKi illegally sold inhabited lands to planters (Mendiaux 1956). By 1930 there
were some 240 plantations in Kivu.
Similar ‘illegal’ methods were used to dispossess inhabitants of what became
the Virunga National Park. Parks were established through the corrupt attribu-
tion of vacancy – the worst following the forced depopulation of the park area on
the pretext of sleeping sickness – and through a public utility law that enabled
‘compensation’ to be paid to Ndeze. Ndeze’s subordinate chiefs could not block
the sale, and the population affected was not consulted and received none of the
compensation (Nzabandora 1984: 59–62; Gapira 1980: 56–7). Ndeze also prof-
ited from shares he acquired in the monopolistic fishing ‘cooperative’ created on
what was then Lake Edward in 1949. Certain local colonial administrators who
attempted to contest the methods of the Park authority and the methods of the
planters found that they were almost powerless in the face of CNKi and the Park
authority (Gapira 1980: 88–91). The latter was answerable to Brussels, not to the
colonial state. 
Labour as well as land was appropriated. During the First World War, local
chiefs had been obliged to send produce, soldiers and porters, leaving a major
famine (known locally as Rumanura) in their wake. In the 1920s and 1930s, vil-
lage chiefs were required to provide 25% of the available male labour force to
work on road-building programmes (Northrup 1988: 195). This burden fell
most heavily on those in contextually inferior positions. Plantation owners ar-
ranged with senior chiefs to force village chiefs to supply labour (Bangamwabo
1982: 49). While it was possible for regular skilled workers to be attached to a
plantation and live on its land, local chiefs preferred to keep workers living on
‘chiefdom’ land, as they maintained authority over them and could tax them. The
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greater powers, threats and obligations that the chiefs now had meant that they
both could and had to extort far higher tributes and corvée (unpaid work for the
state) than they previously had. In many instances it was the chiefs, not workers,
who received pay. Recruitment was often in the name of chiefs, who directed dif-
ferent subordinates to work each day (cf. Bashizi 1978: 16–19).
The administration and planters attempted to prevent any alternatives to co-
lonial employment, whether by keeping food prices too low to be commercially
viable, banning smallholder coffee production or strictly controlling labour mo-
bility. Among men on whom the exactions fell hardest, there were many who fled
their natal lands to other regions where they had greater autonomy. Others mi-
grated to Uganda, where work and conditions were reputedly more favourable.
The authorities responded, however, by sending ‘recapture groups’ to find, bring
back and punish those who had fled the locality or employment to which they
had been restricted. The relatives and wives of those who had fled were forced to
work in their place (Bangamwabo 1982: 51). 
Half of Bwisha’s male population were working on the coffee plantations by
1938 (Northrup 1988: 195), but there were still shortages, prompting forced re-
locations of population from other regions, from Nande-speaking regions to the
north and from Rwanda. During the Second World War, labour conditions
worsened, as if this were still possible. Those not working on the plantations were
forced to do corvée work for 120 days a year, thus easing plantation recruitment
(Anstey 1966: 146–58).
While the settler class had been advantaged during the war, the short-staffed
colonial administration had had to cope with a resultant famine and nascent re-
bellions in 1944–5 (Bezy et al. 1981: 36). Finally, after the war, the administra-
tion took steps to strengthen the rights of the workforce, and curb the power of
the plantations, chiefs and Park (Drevet 1977: 99). Labour markets were freed
and wages rose five-fold. By the mid-1950s more than two-thirds of the male
population were employed (Drevet 1977: 99, Bangamwabo 1982: 78).
The DRC achieved independence in 1960, but any gain for the population
was short-lived. In the election struggle surrounding independence, Kivu’s largest
party was the Centre de Regroupement Africaine (CEREA), whose manifesto in-
cluded opening the park for hunting and farming, and abolishing taxes and cor-
vée. Its vocal membership consisted of those in the newly elected councils,
teachers, and those who had been dispossessed during the Belgian regime. It was
opposed by a party (ARP) supported by the chiefs and the traditional elite, which
sought to ‘uphold custom against radicalism’, though for want of support it had
to merge with the party supported by the white community (PNP). Needless to
say, CEREA won overwhelmingly. In Bwisha, Ndeze fled to Belgium, and a new-
ly elected assembly took over from the ‘traditional’ chiefs.
Yet seven years of political turmoil ensued, including the assassination of the
leftist Lumumba, occupation by UN forces, the eventual failure of the leftist
Mulele rebellion, and the eventual military success of the CIA-backed Mobutu in
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the civil war in 1966. Mobutu then consolidated his rule by reinstating many of
the ‘traditional’ chiefs, including Ndeze in Bwisha. Ndeze thus expanded his
mandate not only as a traditional chief, but also as the state administrator (until
1973). Rumour of a Batutsi bid for political ascendency in Kivu and their back-
ing for the ill-fated Mulele rebellion of the MNC had aided Ndeze’s return to
power. Ndeze had already ‘cleansed’ Bwisha of Batutsi authority once (in the
1920s), and he did so again.
During this period, Kivu’s plantation economy collapsed. The plantations re-
mained territorially intact, but of the nine hundred foreign owned plantations in
Kivu, only fifty remained in partial operation in 1973. The plantation owners
who remained accumulated vast areas of land by purchasing it from those who
were leaving. Then foreign assets were nationalised in 1973. In Rutshuru, the
family of Ndeze, his loyal subordinates and other members of the state adminis-
tration acquired the plantations. This, and instances like it thoughout the coun-
try, provoked a deeper crisis, and in 1976, a 40% stake in some plantations was
ceded back to their original owners to keep them operational. In Bwisha, Mobutu
himself was a major personal beneficiary, and the coffee plantations that he had
interests in were also granted monopolistic marketing powers. 
In short, until the 1950s, an alliance between the colonial administration
(plus its army), the traditional chiefs (plus their police), the planters (plus their
police) and the park (plus their guards) was able, often illegally and corruptly, to
expropriate land from cultivators extort heavy taxes and corvée to build infra-
structure, and recruit labour to work in the plantations. From the 1970s, these
alliances were strengthened, as Ndeze and many administrators themselves be-
came plantation owners. In the 1950s, the administrations’ reform programme
had sought to control the monster that it had created by attempting to strengthen
the power of the population (and itself) relative to this elite by introducing local
democracy and labour laws, but this failed. Wages did improve during the 1950s
boom, but restrictions on education and on credit, coupled with the restrictive
trading practices of the colonial elite, prevented nationals from acquiring capital
in what had become sub-Saharan Africa’s second-most industrialised nation. Fol-
lowing Mobutu’s ascendency, control passed to the new elite, when the old alli-
ance between capital, state and traditional authority was forged once more. 
Plantation profitability and wages slumped. By the mid-1970s many labour-
ers were reluctant to work for wages that had fallen to less than 6% of 1960 levels
in real terms. This was especially so given the growing market for, and profitabil-
ity of food crops, and given emergent opportunities for small-holder coffee pro-
duction. Employers again found it necessary to coerce unfree labour. This could
be achieved in several ways. First, plantation owners could force those who
farmed their land to do more unpaid work for them (two days a week). Secondly,
they could recruit the labour of the desperate and land destitute. Thirdly, em-
ployers were able, given emergent conditions of personal insecurity, to recruit la-
bour by ‘giving protection’ to employees, squatters and indeed land-holders.
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Realising this, employers were not encouraged to reduce levels of violence and in-
security. This ‘protection racketeering’ assisted their recruitment of cheap labour.
Indeed, in many cases, landlords and employers were behind the deployment of
violence (by hiring soldiers who freelanced from their camps) that became en-
demic. 
Employers who worked in increasingly unprofitable circumstances could thus
pass their problems on to their work force, as control over land and security was
used to gain control over labour (see Schoepf and Schoepf 1987: 25). Indeed, de-
spite deepening economic crisis, the 1980s saw a huge increase in the demand for
large tracts of plantation land by self-financing projects, whether church organi-
sations, the urban entrepreneurial elite, the ‘traditional’ chiefs or national (often
Kinshasa-based) politicians. The control of unfree labour by land-holders was
central to the viability of these enterprises. 
During this period, the elite managed to expand their land-holdings. At times
President Mobutu did make some populist attempts to restrict this and the ‘feu-
dal’ economy that emerged. In 1973, Mobutu legislated against inherited chief-
ships and against traditional authorities having perpetual rights to control land.
He legislated in favour of squatters’ rights being granted following three years of
uncontested occupancy. Yet this altered the rules of the game, and its victors, not
the game itself. Indeed, as Schoepf and Schoepf indicated based on their research
in south Kivu, these laws actually enabled all ‘those with power, wealth and in-
fluence…to manipulate the system to appropriate any lands not yet conceded or
titled…including lands currently occupied’ (1987: 22). The legislation advan-
taged the state elite over the traditional one in the struggle for spoils. Internation-
al assistance, in particular in support of ranching (meat-marketing, cattle-health
programmes, infrastructural development) exacerbated this by enhancing the
profitability of cattle-ranching. By 1991, in the highlands of the Masisi area, west
of Bwisha, around 500 families controlled about 60% of the land (Vlassenroot
2002).
In the mid 1980s, a sub-regional committee on land tenure investigated re-
ports of the fraudulent use of the vacancy law and boundary extension. It con-
cluded that: 
 
Our customary chiefs must henceforth know that feudalism has been abolished, that there
is no longer 
 
Bami
 
 [‘traditional’ royalty] land and cattle. It is wrong that they entrench
themselves behind customary jurisdiction, that they dispossess land from their subjects;
that they forbid them rights to build permanent homes, and that they deny them all rights
of ownership, whether it be land or possessions. They must know that their figurehead on
these unconstitutional activities generates interminable land conflicts, which compromise
the socio-economic development of their entities, collectivizes individual litigations, and
stirs up tribal hatred (Katuala et al. 1986: 89, my translation).
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Located Experience of Regional Processes
 
These processes were generalised throughout the more densely populated regions
of Kivu and had profound affects in villages everywhere. In Kagara, the village
where I lived in the hills above the town of Rutshuru in the late 1980s, people’s
exposure to exaction and dispossession was sharply differentiated. This can be
seen in respect of personal security and exemption from informal taxation and
compulsory labour, as well as in land relations.
First, people obtained protection through different institutions. Many of
those who were the descendents of early land-holders, and who thus had more
secure rights to land, sought to maintain their rights to both land and their own
labour through ‘traditional’ authorities, notably the village Kapita, his commit-
tee, and those he favoured. On the other hand, villagers who had ‘state’ positions
in this bifurcated administration
 
1
 
 could secure their rights through the state ad-
ministration that they represented (within the Comité de Base of the Mouvement
Populaire pour la Révolution or MRP as it was then called), or through employ-
ment in state-supported institutions (e.g. as schoolteachers, Red Cross officials or
‘development’ representatives). Some other families were able to draw on the
backing of their church (whether Catholic, Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist or one
of the profusion of new Protestant churches), or the mosque. Churches supported
and protected their ministers, and indeed their flocks. To achieve this (and, cyn-
ically, to secure a following), the churches fostered regional and national political
connections and, with the help of these, operated a sophisticated protection sys-
tem. Church communities provided legal support in land claims (for example,
upholding squatters’ rights over traditional rights in national courts) and provid-
ed physical protection to those who were being violently harassed. In the Catholic
system, for example, one member of the local chapel would follow anyone who
had been arrested, while another would be dispatched to the mission to alert the
higher authorities and initiate support and release procedures. Lastly, as in the co-
lonial period, plantation owners would ensure protection for their own relatively
skilled employees. 
People advertised their protection when travelling. Identity cards peered from
plastic pockets on the outside of jackets, and metal ‘MPR’ Party badges on the
lapel, bibles in hand and crosses hanging loose all signified protection to any mil-
itary or police operative that one might encounter. These modes of protection
clearly hark back to colonial times, when administrative jobs, social clout or em-
ployment would exempt the lucky from army recruitment, tax and forced labour. 
The importance of such protection extended to land and labour. Land grab-
bing was not restricted to the major players. Thus it also became possible for land-
holders, whether high- or low-ranking chiefs, or representatives of more powerful
 
1. See Mamdani 1996 for further analysis of bifurcation between state and traditional authority
throughout the continent. 
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lineages, to claim that lands that they or their parents had once ceded to strangers
had simply been ‘let’. They redefined the ‘tributes’ that the strangers had paid as
‘rent’, allowing them to claim that the land still belonged to them. Such land
grabbing was limited where I lived to the actions of a huge neighbouring planta-
tion that seized a third of the village’s land after successfully pursuing what the
village felt was a false boundary dispute. 
In this particular village, the founding lineage had lost political control to a
ritually illegitimate appointee. They were poor and in no position to exert their
ancestral rights. Until the 1960s, newcomers soliciting land in the village were
usually granted some by this family. From the 1970s, however, a growing market
for land had grown up due to land scarcity, reductions in plantation work, de-
clining wages and increased reliance on farming for food and cash, alongside an
increase in ‘distress sales’ by the poor. Wealthier villages consolidated their hold-
ings, disparaging those who sold because of their lack of ‘ability’ (
 
ukuntu
 
), their
foolish impulsiveness, and their inability to ‘resist meat’ (and drink). Land ar-
rangements ceased to be ritually significant. 
In a neighbouring village, expropriation occurred differently. A large ancestral
landholding family had tried to evict those to whom they had granted land under
past social and economic conditions in the ways described above, by redefining
their subordinates as tenants and squatters. In this instance, the churches directly
supported the tenants’ and squatters’ case in the state court. They also used its
rituals (exorcism) to oppose directly the ancestors (redefined as devils) of past
land-holders who were particularly feared. 
It is possible to draw too sharp a distinction between this ‘grabbing by direct
expropriation and land losses through the market. Those in vulnerable positions
with respect to mobility and labour were led to sell land. In this respect, contin-
uing control over land has come to depend more on political connections and
protection, as well as its income effects, as much as on inheritance and the asser-
tion of rights. A similar story is told by André and Platteau (1998) in pre-geno-
cide Rwanda, where access to land began to depend more on access to off-farm
income (urban employment and mortgage facilities) than on inheritance. In the
village, all modern land transactions are imaged in relation to the notions of the
possessor and the dispossessor, in stark contrast to past relations of the politico-
ritual chief and subordinate, which had earlier been the stuff of political and so-
cial alliance. 
In short, with the collapse of the economy in the 1970s and 1980s, the dis-
tinction between those who had invested in protective institutions (and who had
documents showing them to be part of a greater community), and those who had
not, became increasingly important. My fairly robust assessment, based on key
informants, suggested that about a quarter of adult men in the village could avoid
direct expropriation. For example, they felt safe in using the roads without being
vulnerable to expropriation from the military and police of assorted forces, and
they were exempt from forced labour and labour tribute for their land. When it
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came to constructing a road to the village, these people were strongly in favour,
finding common interest and a source of friendship in these issues – a wealthy
elite with a ‘wider’ outlook (Fairhead 1992). On the other hand, a poorer major-
ity, many of whom lacked any documentation whatsoever, felt that the road
would bring yet further control and expropriation from the centre, not to men-
tion them being forced to build this vehicle of their own oppression themselves. 
Protection for the village elite did not come cheap. For example, the Kapita
used to exempt relatives, friends and respected men from compulsory state la-
bour, for which they paid twenty litres of banana wine and a chicken annually.
The compulsory labour burden then fell on younger and poorer men instead. De-
spite the opportunities for ‘buy out’, however, it was better to have ‘real’ exemp-
tion than to pay others for a piece of theirs, as such payments inevitably increased.
Yet proper protection itself required self-exploitation. None of the jobs that guar-
anteed protection paid a salary: the jobs had to pay for themselves. 
Social changes have added to, and shaped, patterns of marginalisation from
land and livelihood. Vulnerable people who had hitherto had access to land via
customary land claims find that such claims are no longer being honoured by
land-holders. This is particularly true of return migrants, separated women, wives
in polygynous marriages, widows, the handicapped, orphans and the children of
broken marriages. While this is linked to land shortages amongst the land poor,
it is accentuated throughout society by that the trend towards land-holding be-
coming more dependent on purchase than inheritance, as purchased land is large-
ly excluded from these wider forms of social rights and entitlements. As André
and Platteau (1998) also note in Rwanda, a particularly important transforma-
tion has occured in the number of children who are born of marriages which are
not ‘legal’ because poor men have been unable to provide the bridewealth re-
quired of a marriage. This has two effects. First, wives of such households usually
adopt a strategy of maintaining more independent economic activities. Secondly,
wives and the children of such marriages have very poor claims to land. André and
Platteau suggest that in Rwanda, the children of more than two thirds of marriag-
es have precarious tenure. Whether or not the proportions are so high in the Kivu
case is unclear. The manner in which rights vary with assorted forms of partial
payment has evolved, and it has been the young man’s responsibility to pay
bridewealth, especially among the majority of the poor since the economic col-
lapse of the 1960s and 1970s. 
It is not my intention to document in detail how these modes of exaction and
economic decline and the social changes associated with them are shaping land
use. Rather, I would like to suggest a few implications that will be suggestive of
the field that I have explored elsewhere (Fairhead 1990). First, few people now
let land, or indeed offer any debt at all. Anyone who does make such arrange-
ments ensures that they are more formalised, restricting how tenants use the land:
no perennial crops and no permanent dwellings are allowed. Land use in the re-
gion is thus shaped by the need to assert tenure over the land you wish to claim,
 J a m e s  F a i r h e a d
 
206
 
by establishing perennial crops, whether coffee, bananas or exotic trees, and
building perennial houses, that is, those with metal roofs, or inversely, by refusing
these things. This response to tenurial ambiguity is generic to much of East Afri-
ca.
Most farmers hold land under a variety of tenure arrangements. For those
with limited land, their most secure land must be devoted to perennials that they
cannot cultivate elsewhere. These crops tend to reduce erosion and be under the
control of men. The more seasonal food crops, those under women’s or ‘house-
hold’ control, and which are more erosion-sensitive, tend to be marginalised on
lands which farmers hold in a less secure way, often at some distance from home.
The tenure system has thus disrupted potentially more sustainable and integrated
farming methods. Moreover, the legacy of the history of land possession is that
ecologically marginal and highly erosion-prone land has often remained in the
possession of chiefs and large landowners. It is these fragile lands which are let to
land-poor farmers, who only cultivate seasonal crops there. In this instance, inse-
cure tenure certainly hinders land improvements, although this is not necessarily
a general feature of land insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Place and Hazell
1993). 
A third impact concerns the greater individual autonomy in economic rela-
tions between parents and children, and between husbands and wives. Given the
economic tensions that exist in many households, many, especially poorer wom-
en have pursued a range of land-use strategies to avoid losing control over their
produce. This includes cultivating crops that involve less male participation in
production, cultivating outside seasonal patterns, and ‘storing in the field’ rather
than in the house to limit bulk supply (and to protect stocks against soldiers and
looting). They also tend to sell stocks earlier. 
 
Exit Options and Rebel Movements
 
From the early colonial period, many young men in structurally poor positions
had sought an exit option, whether in migration to the copper mines to the south
or to Uganda to the east. In the early period, as already noted, attempts were made
to track such dissenters down or to harm their families. Out-migration became
popular again in the 1960s and 1970s, when Ugandan wages were three times
those in Congo. More than half the men living in the village in the 1980s had
worked in Uganda at one time, and many others remained. Yet by the 1980s, op-
portunities for out-migration to find employment had become much more re-
stricted. This was a period when many Congolese began migrating south, into
Zambia, Angola and South Africa, acquiring a dubious reputation throughout
the continent. 
Other alternatives have been speculative gold or coltan digging, or settling in
remote regions in the forest. Migrants to these areas, as strangers without secure
networks, become subordinate to the mine owners or the land chiefs of the forest
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tracts. Thus while the ability of entrepreneurial migrants to ‘get by’ has been cel-
ebrated as part of the DRC’s ‘informal economy’, this has itself been shadowed
by an informal polity, such as those that I have described which gate-keep protec-
tion and economic opportunity, and which are linked to modes of protection and
exaction. So those taking the mining option – in the DRC, at least – do not es-
cape Kivu’s predatory economy. 
On occasions, options have emerged to link up with rebels. Thus, the rebel
movements linked to the 1965 Mulele rebellion continued in South Kivu until
the 1980s. It was eventually restricted in its operations to parts of South Kivu
controlling gold mining there and, according to credible accounts (Schatzberg
1988), trading gold with their opponents, the army of Mobutu, in exchange for
arms. The rebel commander, Laurent Kabila, traded the remainder of the gold
out of Burundi and Tanzania. This earlier ‘rebellion’ found a way to become self-
sustaining. For low-ranking soldiers working among the rebels, or as national sol-
diers in the ‘
 
Zone Rouge
 
’ region of the conflict, the conflict did not provide an
opportunity for accumulation. For populations living in theatre of rebellion, it
was a decade of impoverishment and depopulation. 
In short, wider forms of exaction that date back to early colonial times remain
the central forces shaping village life. They shape people’s differential relations
with the different institutions that link the village to the wider political field and
their investments in these. They shape people’s access to their own labour, their
mobility and personal geography (using footpaths or roads). They shape modes
of marriage, inheritance, disinheritance and destitution. 
 
Coltan and the Current Conflict
 
Before considering how the contemporary conflict is being shaped by the strate-
gies of foreign powers, I would like to review how the emergent war economy
could be understood as a development of these existing economic and political
patterns. As with the remnants of the Mulele rebellion, which fought on between
1967 and 1980 under Laurent Kabila, the first rebellion against Mobutu (1996–
98, also led by Kabila) and now the second rebellion against Kabila and then his
son’s presidency has developed into a self-financing – indeed extremely profitable
– endeavour. 
The new occupying armies took over existing modes of self-financing, based
on practices of exaction and forging links with a new, and not so new, economic
elite. Yet these dynamics in Kivu were accentuated by the boom in the mining of
coltan from late 1999 to early 2001. Coltan is mined in particular areas through-
out Kivu. Different mines were captured by different forces. Some mining areas
fell under Rwandan and rebel control. Other zones were controlled by their op-
ponents, the former Rwandan army and their militia. According to some inform-
ants to the Pole Institute (2001), it is Congolese Hutu (from Bwisha?) who
transport the material across the lines to sell in Rwandan controlled areas. Some
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mines are controlled by Mai-mai forces, — a militia that began as ethnic-linked
protection forces, but which also became freelance in operation. Other mines
(e.g. in Lubero) are controlled by Ugandan forces and Ugandan-backed rebels.
Militias and armies with their origins in other causes now fight to control the
mines. Spoliation now also focuses on coltan mining sites as the object of dispute. 
Yet it is not just control of the mines, but also of the control of labour which
is important. As the UN report summarises: ‘With minor exceptions, the objec-
tive of military activity is to secure access to mining sites or ensure a supply of cap-
tive labour’ (UN 2002, paragraph 93).
Many of the Coltan reserves in the region appear to have been developed ini-
tially by young men who gained authorisation by land owners and authorities.
Yet now most of the work is no longer conducted by them, but by employees,
and coerced labour. 
As the final report of the UN panel of experts states:
 
The bulk of coltan...as much as 60 to 70 per cent, has been mined under the direct sur-
veillance of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) mining détachés and evacuated by aircraft
from airstrips near mining sites directly to Kigali or Cyangugu. No taxes are paid. Rwan-
dan military aircraft, Victor Bout's aircraft and small airline companies are used in the
evacuation of the coltan. RPA has maintained control over most of the coltan sites where
rich deposits are found, where the percentage of tantalum is high, and where local airstrips
are accessible. A variety of forced labour regimes are found at sites that have been managed
by RPA mining détachés, some for coltan collection, some for transport, others for domes-
tic services. Many accounts report the widespread use of prisoners imported from Rwanda
who work as indentured labour. (UN 2002, paragraph 75)
 
Other mines remain under the control of manager supervisors, themselves under
the surveillance of police monitors. Miners are day labourers without a contract.
When the price of coltan fell in 2001, the coltan economy did not cease, but was
maintained through the use of conscript and forced labour. One commercial in-
formant to the UN Panel ‘explained that, because of the collapsed international
coltan market, prices for the mineral in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo had dropped dramatically. However...the continuing international inter-
est in coltan from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is due to the very low
labour costs for extracting the mineral’ (UN 2002, para 109)
In summing up the mode of illegal exploitation, the UN report identifies net-
works of:
 
a small core of political and military elites and business persons and, in the case of the oc-
cupied areas, selected rebel leaders and administrators. Some members of the elite net-
works occupy key positions in their respective Governments or rebel groups. Members of
these networks cooperate to generate revenue and, in the case of Rwanda, institutional fi-
nancial gain. The elite networks ensure the viability of their economic activities through
control over the military and other security forces that they use to intimidate, threaten vi-
olence or carry out selected acts of violence. The networks monopolize production, com-
merce and fiscal functions. The elite networks maintain the facade of rebel administrations
in the occupied areas to generate public revenues that they then divert into the networks,
thereby depleting the public treasury. (UN 2002)
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Most journalistic and academic reports have focused on the smaller-scale coltan
exploitation which they have had access to. They focus on the entrepreneurial
peasant echoing works celebrating the ‘entrepreneurial’ means that the poor use
to ‘get by’ (cf. de Boeck 1999; Jackson 2001). From this perspective, the poor’s
engagement with mining has been considered as one more means of ‘getting by’,
thus exposing the continuities in this mode of economic life. Yet in regions where
entrepreneurial youths continue to mine, access is not straightforward. In Rwan-
dan-held areas, they tend to be Rwandan-speaking Tutsi youth. As one informant
to the Pole Institute put it, ‘At the moment it is a high-risk job, especially if you
are not a Hutu or a Tutsi. Our young Hunde miners are shot at point-blank range’
(Pole 2001). In other regions, miners, intermediaries and major traders all had to
pay a ‘licence’ fee to RCD rebels, which itself was a major investment. What is
missing in this focus on resourcefulness is attention to the less ‘heroic’ continui-
ties that I have foregrounded in this chapter: the entrepreneurial abilities of the
elite, invaders and military. Unfortunately the anthropology of resourcefulness in
celebration of everyday struggle and humour has played into the claims of corpo-
rations such as the Bayer group, which claim that their tantalum originates from
‘peasant suppliers’, not from rebel groups. Yet as the UN report bluntly noted at
this time, ‘in fact, no coltan exits from the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo without benefiting either the rebel group or foreign armies.’ Missing from
our accounts, then, has been the story of the three million who did not ‘get by’. 
The trade in coltan is also monopolised. The UN report suggests that only:
 
A smaller portion, perhaps 15 to 25 per cent of the total coltan exported, is purchased by
comptoirs owned by Rwandans who buy from local négotiants at remote coltan sites or
from the agents of local defence groups. More typically these comptoirs, owned by Rwan-
dan army officers or those closely linked to the Government of Rwanda, such as MHI
comptoir, Eagle Wings or Rwanda Metals, have obtained their own mining sites and con-
script their own workers to exploit the sites under severe conditions.
 
The view of those not involved is that the boom mostly enriches only the elite,
whose experience of the coltan economy mirrors that of plantations: 
 
On the whole the relationship [of the mines] with the authorities is good. With the local
population the relationship is not good. The population is unhappy with the mining con-
ditions. They also criticise the fact that mining takes place on the land of large landowners
and only benefits them (Pole Institute 2001).
 
 A prevalent image in much of the literature has been the apparent ‘banditry’ of
militia forces. Thus militia have been known to ‘attack their own village’; their
own ‘parents’; even their own traditional chiefs (Jackson 2001). Yet when the dif-
ferentiated experiences of exaction at the local level are clarified, a common logic
of the settling of scores emerges in which chiefly families are targeted by those
who have been in structurally subordinate positions.
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 International Dimensions to the Conflict
 
In similar works that sketch out the long history and local manifestations of Con-
go’s looting economy, once dubbed its kleptocracy, one tendency has been to con-
sider it in relation to ‘Mobutu’ and ‘African corruption’. Yet from the outset of
Belgian rule, these patterns of governance have reflected international interest in
what is now the DRC. 
Early Belgian interest in Congo was driven by the pre-First World War rubber
boom and the wider ‘Scramble for Africa’. While Belgium soon became Congo’s
main trading partner, the United States became the principal market for its raw
materials from the 1940s. Indeed, the country soon gained a Cold War strategic
interest for its uranium. By the late 1950s, it had an experimental nuclear reactor,
and at independence became a nuclear state. Yet its strategic importance grew fur-
ther around its cobalt and manganese. As Mazrui and Ajayi note, in the 1970s
‘[a] major reason why the West was bailing out Mobutu Sese Seko...was the im-
portance of Zaire’s cobalt for western technology and industry’ (1993:651) This
mineral has become strategically central. Indeed, the DRC had the credentials of
being the Saudi Arabia of cobalt’ (Adedeji 1993, 426). Cobalt is a critical ingre-
dient in the superalloys used in air- and land-based turbine engines, as well as for
rechargeable batteries for cell phones and computers. Environmental pressures
for zero emission vehicles will massively increase demand for this ‘oil of the fu-
ture’.
Strategic minerals are those that are militarily, politically or economically es-
sential. The most significant strategic minerals are those for which supply is high-
ly concentrated in a limited number of states, from which major military-
industrial powers must import. Congo’s cobalt and now the tantalum (in coltan)
can claim this status. All five major capitalist countries (France, Germany, Japan,
UK, USA) are critically
 
1
 
 dependent on cobalt and Tantalum. The tensile, heat
and electrical properties of tantalum make it a crucial ingredient in armour pen-
etration and missile technology, housing radioactive elements, including in nu-
clear reactors, manufacturing capacitors for third-generation computer
technology (e.g. in mobile phones), rocket motors and radiation shielding.
 Changing patterns of international resource demand have led to increased
import dependence on these minerals. As declared strategic minerals, the US has
at times accumulated extensive stockpiles of cobalt and tantalum. This trend to-
wards increasing dependence preoccupies many military and economic strategists
the world over. Over the last decade, international security officials have been
paying even greater attention to intensified competition over these strategic ma-
terials, and this has regained centrality in American Security Planning. Indeed
Klare, writing in 
 
Foreign Affairs
 
, goes further, arguing that there is now a ‘new ge-
 
1. That is, when supplies come from few suppliers, over long distances, or from a country of a dif-
ferent ideology.
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ography of conflict, a reconfigured cartography in which resource flows rather
than political and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines’ (2001:
51). Nowhere is this more appropriate than in southern Africa for its minerals
and in western Africa for its oil. At the heart of all this is the DRC. 
Strategic resources have now acquired further importance following the at-
tacks on the USA on September 11th 2001. First, Africa’s ‘non-Islamic oil’ has
become central to the geopolitics of energy. Secondly, as former Assistant Secre-
tary of State Susan Rice argued in the context of the US House of Representa-
tives’ deliberations on Africa and the war on global terrorism:
 
We must recognize that regimes lacking legitimacy and failed states are convenient safe ha-
vens as well as breeding grounds for terrorists. If we are serious about our anti-terrorism
commitment...the US must become more rather than less engaged in the difficult task of
peacemaking, peacekeeping and national reconstruction – from the Great Lakes to Sierra
Leone, from Liberia to Sudan and Somalia. We must also find effective ways to secure Af-
rica’s vast natural resources – its diamonds, cobalt, uranium, oil, timber, coltan, its gold –
so they do not provide currency for the world's terrorists. (Rice 2001: 12)
 
While these aspects preoccupy strategists, they also offer immense profit to those
who control their supply. Strategic minerals tend to be price–inelastic: that is, if
prices rise, the amount demanded does not fall. Rather, if supply can be assured,
the buyer is often willing to pay a very high price. As Hveem (1986) notes, in stra-
tegic terms, embargoes are worse than price increases. Under such conditions,
there is a huge potential for monopolistic behaviour, and conglomerates control-
ling strategic elements can make massive profits by forming cartels, through intra-
firm trade etc. There have been many times that neither cobalt nor tantalum have
had a traded world price: prices tend to be set by producers or negotiated in con-
tractual arrangements. Those who control these minerals can exert huge leverage
(‘rents’) over industries that depend on them, especially if they form cartels. Con-
trol has been highly concentrated at the corporate level. 
In the 1990s, for example, the reduction in Zaire’s (as it then was) cobalt out-
put (from 10,000 tonnes/annum in 1992 to ca. 2–3,000 tonnes) forced the price
up from about $6/pound to $25–$33/pound. This made access to the DRC’s co-
balt reserves worth more to corporations which control the rest of the world’s
supply (principally American Mineral Fields, which controls much of Canada’s
reserves). Informed analysts predict that if the DRC’s cobalt production picks up
again, the price of cobalt may drop from $25/pound to $7/pound (
 
The Econo-
mist
 
, May 3rd 1997: 62), massively reducing, for example, the value and extrac-
tion profitability of American Mineral Field’s Canadian reserves. It is not
surprising, then, that the principle firm competing for the DRC’s cobalt reserves
at that time was AMF, which not only controlled much of the Canadian reserves,
but could maintain their value by limiting the DRC’s supply. Cuba, the other
major cobalt producer, was embargoed internationally. 
Entrepreneurs will go to great lengths to secure reserves. Those who already
have reserves remain undaunted by backing both sides of a conflict, and even bro-
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kering peace negotiations, as Anglo-American did in South Africa. On the other
hand, non-established firms who are seeking to capture reserves can back one
side, perhaps hoping, in the event of victory, to displace competitors. In the
DRC, the major established mining corporations were largely francophone, but
following the conflict, anglophone ones are taking over. 
 
Africa Confidential
 
 has
referred to ‘considerable brawling among foreign investors’ and notes that
’French and Belgians, Japanese and South Africans, suspect that the advance of
the Alliance’s troops will mainly benefit North American mining corporations’
(25 April 1997, 38[9], 3).
North American, European and Asian corporations have struck deals with
both governments and rebels. At the same time, the world’s leading mining cor-
porations have supported protagonists in the conflict, profiting both from their
interests there and, indeed, from the increased value of their reserves elsewhere
when conflict disrupts Congolese production. 
Many of the corporations operating in the DRC and its neighbours have
strong political connnections. These are hard to research in detail, but some in-
dication of the links involved can be gauged from the ‘revolving door’ that sees
senior figures in government moving in and out of corporations. In recent years,
for example, Barrick Gold, which has large interests in the DRC, has counted
three former CIA directors and two former North American Presidents in its
management (George Bush Snr., Richard Helms, Robert Gates and Brian Mol-
roney). The Bechtel Corporation, which also worked with Laurent Kabila during
his first rebellion, has had former US Secretary of State George Schultz alongside
Philip Habib and Casper Weinberger working for it, as well as CIA directors Wil-
liam Casey and Richard Helms. Haliburton Oil – which, together with its sub-
sidiary, Brown and Root, has major oil and other interests in the region – had
current US Vice-President Richard Cheyney as its CEO until his nomination.
Until recently Chevron Oil, which is now involved in a $2bn investment in the
DRC, counted Condoleezza Rice as a member of its board, prior towhich she was
a Special Assistant to George Bush, and is now US National Security Advisor.
Corporate expansion in conflict zones has coincided with an explosion in private
security firms, mostly mercenaries. The largest private security transnationals not
only work closely with the US government, but are owned by former members.
The Vinnell Corporation of Fairfax, Virginia, for example, is owned by BDM In-
ternational Inc. and controlled by the
 
 
 
Carlyle Group, which counts former ex-
CIA Vice-Director
 
 
 
Frank Carlucci and US Secretary of State James Baker among
its major shareholders. Carlucci was Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan
and George Bush Snr. and, it might be noted, was also former Second Secretary
at the US embassy in the DRC, and later became Deputy Director of the CIA.
The nature of corporate and political links can perhaps be gauged well in the
work of Cohen & Woods, a Washington-based lobbying firm. On the one hand,
this has worked for both mining and security firms who are seeking contracts and
concessions in Africa, such as MPRI in Angola, while on the other hand it has
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worked for African leaders seeking US political support, such as the late Laurent
Kabila. This is managed by Herman Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, and Jim Woods, former Assistant Secretary of State of US De-
fense.
The firm that is most implicated in exporting coltan from Rwanda is
Trinitech International, which itself owns Eagle Wings Resources. Its main
 
 
 
office
is in Rwanda, and its manager there in the early 1990s was President Kageme’s
brother-in-law. It collaborates with the Rwandan People’s Army in order to re-
ceive privileged access to coltan sites and captive labour. It was exporting to the
Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan, to its parent company Trinitech Inter-
national Inc. in the United States, and to Bayer. Its official owners are Robert and
Eileen Raun, the former apparently a luminary of the University of Nebraska,
one-time Secretary of Agriculture in that state, and a one-time governor of the
Kellogg foundation. 
 
Conclusion
 
Environmental resources are fundamental to poor and indebted modern African
economies. This paper has focused less on how patterns of governance have been
able to influence the management of environmental resources than the inverse,
namely how the transnational dimensions of the management of valuable envi-
ronmental resources influence patterns of governance. It is this that modern pol-
icy must address. As Montague has recently argued for the DRC, ‘In order for
investment to be used as an effective tool for development, multinationals must
understand that massive corporate investments have a negative impact on society
in the absence of state stability. Indeed, their financial leverage only exacerbates
state instability’ (Montague 2002: 115). The present chapter has traced how these
transnational engagements shape natural resources management. 
Secondly, there have been several periods of economic recession, during which
the continued profitability of enterprises rooted in these alliances has been main-
tained by control over unfree labour, in many cases linked either to ‘protection
racketeering’ or to extending control over land. It is clear that the ‘war-lord’ na-
ture of the contemporary DRC represents an extension of earlier practices that
have long been current in the region. The classic distinctions between ‘war’ and
‘peace’ throw this strong continuity out of focus. The analysis here supports
Keen’s argument that ‘war can usefully be seen as a deepening of exploitative
processes already existing in “normal” times’ (1994: 12) 
Thirdly, the conflict in the region is not simply about ‘one people’ against oth-
ers. Because of this, a prevalent image in much of the literature on conflict in
Congo and elsewhere has been the apparent ‘banditry’ of militia forces. Yet when
the differentiated experiences of exaction at the local level are clarified, the form
that this takes become more comprehensible. Understanding these attacks re-
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quires a consideration of a century of engagement between transnational corpo-
rate and imperial interests and Congolese society. 
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